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A 
Postscript for Charles Black: The 
Supreme Court and Race in the 
Progressive Era 
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.f 
Charles Black's work in constitutional law is,1 like the "slow politics of 
the text"2 of the great Document itself, a statement of fundamental truths 
about our condition and aspirations that often takes a while to set in. As 
Harry Wellington has noted, few people had the sense to see The People 
and the Court3 when published in 1960 for what it should with deliberate 
speed have become: the dominant influence on my generation of constitu? 
tional lawyers' efforts to see the problem of judicial review beyond the 
shadows of the New Deal and the debacle of FDR's Court-Packing Plan. 
The book has, along with related works such as Decision According to 
Law4 constituted our era's main answer to the perennial anxiety that ju? 
dicial review is a usurpation of democratic powers vested in the legislative 
and executive branches. Black has also been our era's main exponent of 
the related truth so hard for many to swallow: that courts have in fact and 
are invited by the "democratic branches" to have large powers for social 
change, powers that grow rather than dissipate with sensible, principled 
and high-minded use. At the same time, Black's approach is rooted in the 
insistence that judicial review is an exercise of law and not of fiat; no one 
is more withering about those who would turn to courts for a fix anytime 
the political processes prove deaf, slow or inconvenient. Indeed, Black's 
view that constitutional law must be rooted in principle has been the basis 
for one of his most important insights about judicial review, that its prime 
importance lies not in its checking function but rather in its capacity to 
give legitimacy to the exercise of governmental power. 
Amid the reams of writing about the problem of constitutional interpre? 
tation, Charles Black's Edward Douglass White Lectures, Structure and 
f President, Yale University. 
1. I do not use the past tense. See, e.g., his Samuel Rubin Lecture at Columbia given a few weeks 
ago, Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional fustice of Livelihood, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Oct. 1986), a vigorous and unorthodox statement of the relation of the Constitution to an 
asserted right of minimum material human dignity. 
2. The phrase is borrowed from my Columbia colleague Edward Said. 
3. C. Black, Thk Pkoim.k and thk Court (1960). 
4. C. Black, Dkcision According to Law (1981). 
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Relationship in Constitutional Law,6 is recognized everywhere as a clas? 
sic. This brilliant essay recalled our era to a time-honored and sensible 
mode of interpretation that goes a long way to preserving the domain of 
principle in constitutional law despite the inevitable shortcomings of tex? 
tual exegesis. 
For all of the importance of his general writings on constitutional law, 
for me Charles Black's greatest contributions have centered on the prob? 
lem of racial justice, the problem, as I learned first from him, that is and 
always has been the central problem of American constitutional law. No 
one has added more to our understanding of law and race than Charles 
Black. With his Texan's sense of the reality of race relations, a grounding 
rooted both in his capacity for despair and in his faith in the ultimate 
claims of decency and justice, with his Southerner's gift for stirring our 
senses of beauty and tragedy with writing that has the feel of people and 
the smell of the earth, and with his long view of historical consciousness, 
Charles Black has changed the way all of us think about the Constitution 
and racial justice. 
It was Black's article The Lawfulness ofthe Segregation Decisions* that 
saw the invidious and purposeful segregation in Brown not as an isolated 
insult, but as one feature of a general system of racial subjugation histori- 
cally rooted in slavery and the Black Codes. Moreover, Black saw that it 
must be the central, if sadly deferred, mission of the post-Civil War 
Amendments to outlaw this entire system. In thus generalizing the basis of 
Brown, Black's article offered a compelling defense of the decision against 
critics who attacked it as inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's 
original intent,7 as a denial of freedom of association,8 and as an expres? 
sion of political power not appropriate to the judiciary.9 Twenty years 
later, of course, the Supreme Court recognized that the core of equal pro? 
tection jurisprudence rested on what Black had said in 1955, invidious 
purpose.10 
A decade later, it fell again to Black to provide the critical principled 
defense of another race relations decision, Reitman v. Mulkey11 which I 
5. C. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). 
6. Black, The Lawfulness ofthe Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960). 
7. See, e.g., R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 117-33 (1977). 
8. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959). 
In Wechsler's view, segregation was not an issue of "discrimination" but of "freedom of association." 
For him, the "challenge" of school segregation cases was to find neutral principals to decide between 
the competing association claims of segregationists and integrationists. 
9. See, e.g., The "Southern Manifesto," signed by numerous Southern Senators and Representa? 
tives in 1954, 100 Cong. Rec. 725-57 (1954). 
10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
11. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding California's anti-fair housing initiative to violate 14th 
Amendment). 
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know Chief Justice Warren thought was the most important decision 
since Brown. Black's brilliant 1967 Forward in the Harvard Law Re? 
view12 gave this pivotal decision a foundation in reason that has stood the 
test of two decades, and it offered a perspective on the overall problem of 
state action that is the most persuasive in modern constitutional law 
scholarship. 
Black lately has turned his attention to the constitutional implications of 
poverty, educational deprivation, and social degradation that menace our 
hopes for racial justice.13 It will be interesting to see over the next twenty 
years whether Black's approach to these problem has the same generative 
power as his earlier writing. Sadly, I have to say that I have my doubts. 
In closing his renowned Edward Douglass White Lectures, Charles 
Black remarked on the striking truth that, during the Chief Justiceship of 
White, who was himself a Confederate veteran from Louisiana, the Su? 
preme Court for the first time since Reconstruction held the line against 
the rampant racism that increasingly gripped the country from the 1890's 
on.14 I have thought Black's remarks captured a feeling of empathy across 
the years between Black, the Texan who became the preeminent constitu? 
tional theorist of racial justice, and Edward Douglass White, the child of 
Thibodaux, Lafourche Parish, who as Chief Justice, for all his limita? 
tions, joined in the Peonage Cases16 and Buchanan v. Warley1* and took 
the lead in consigning the Grandfather Clause to that part of the constitu? 
tional scrapheap reserved for the most odious frauds on our legal order.17 
Modest though this postscript is, I hope that it will deepen the historical 
and constitutional kinship between Black and White. 
My own published work on the Supreme Court and race relations dur? 
ing the Progressive era has focussed on cases failing into the large consti? 
tutional categories of peonage, voting rights, Jim Crow laws,18 and jury 
discrimination.19 This organization left no obvious place for discussion of 
12. Black, Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 
Harv. L. Rkv. 69 (1967). 
13. See, e.g., Black, supra note 1. 
14. C. Black, supra note 5, at 97-98. 
15. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (peonage law, making failure to perform labor con? 
tract a criminal offense, violates Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 
(1914). 
16. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (city ordinance prohibiting colored persons from occupying certain prop? 
erty violates Fourteenth Amendment right to equal enjoyment of property). 
17. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (state 
may not impose a standard for suffrage which existed prior to Fifteenth Amendment and was ren? 
dered unconstitutional thereby). 
18. A. Bickki. & B. Schmidt, The Judiciary and Responsible Government 1910-1921, 
Part 2 (1984); Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive 
Era (pts. 1-3), 82 Colum. L. Rkv. 444 (1982), 82 Colum. L. Rev. 646 (1982), 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
835 (1982). 
19. Schmidt, furies, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. 
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several decisions that fell outside the constitutional rubrics, but seemed 
revealing of the nature of race relations of the times and of the Supreme 
Court's reaction to it. This postscript treats those cases. 
If it was a mistake not to include these cases before, as I now think, the 
mistake is not one Charles Black would have made. One of Charles 
Black's strengths as a constitutional law scholar is his sustained curiosity 
and expert knowledge about areas of law not embraced within constitu? 
tional law's sprawling manifest destiny. Among the important scholars of 
judicial review and constitutional interpretation, only Charles Black and 
one or two others can claim preeminence in a second major field of law. 
Black's other strength, of course, is Admiralty, in which the treatise he 
wrote with his late friend Grant Gilmore dominates the field. Black's pen- 
etrating engagement with this ancient body of law, not shaped in the main 
by the peculiar institution of Supreme Court constitutional review and not 
pulled and hauled by the tidal forces of constitutional history, has, I be? 
lieve, strongly influenced his work in constitutional law. Charles Black's 
appreciation for qualities that are general in the law has imbued his con? 
stitutional law writing with liberating discipline, with realism about what 
one can and should expect from judges in the way of principled creativity, 
and with a professional's sense of proportion about the surmountable com? 
plexity and manageable doubt of legal interpretation. In tribute to Charles 
Black, this postscript travels the non-constitutional countryside to better 
appreciate and explain the more familiar landmarks of Progressive era 
constitutional adjudication. 
Although racial separation, peonage, and voting rights were the areas of 
primary activity in the Supreme Court's work in the constitutional law of 
race relations during the Progressive era, race cases not involving, or at 
least not perceived to involve, great constitutional questions came to the 
White Court as well, and in two of these relatively obscure, uncharged 
cases the Justices' attitudes toward race relations stood sharply etched. 
The Court also revealed itself in roads not taken, in cases of would-be 
importance that were summarily disposed of without grappling with sub? 
stantial questions of racial justice, or that elicited opinions while avoiding 
the confrontation of serious questions. The most notable area of abstention 
concerned the rampant racism of Southern criminal law administration, 
especially concerning the exclusion of blacks from Southern juries, the one 
important constitutional area of race relations where the White Court's 
record of achievement fails short of its predecessor, the Fuller Court. 
West Virginia, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 1401 (1983). 
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I. Jones v. Jones: The Final Word of "A Confederate 
Through and Through" 
Jones v. Jones20 was a modest case in which no obvious injustice was 
done, but which upheld a distinction in Tennessee's law that projected a 
legal disability based on slave birth into the Twentieth century. Disposed 
of complacently at the end of the 1913 Term by a unanimous Court, the 
case concerned the inheritance of 87 acres of land owned by John Jones, a 
black freedman who had died in 1889 leaving no children and no will. 
His widow claimed the estate under a Tennessee statute providing that a 
spouse should inherit when an intestate dies "leaving no heirs at law ca? 
pable of inheriting the real estate."21 Tennessee's statute of descent pre- 
ferred the brothers and sisters of an intestate to the spouse, but the Ten? 
nessee courts had construed this statute to cover only brothers and sisters 
born free of free parents. Children of slaves born as slaves, under the state 
court's construction, could not inherit as "heirs at law."22 Jones' siblings 
had given a quitclaim deed on the property to one Will Jones (unrelated 
so far as the record revealed), but since they had been born slaves, they 
were not "heirs at law" within the meaning of the Tennessee statutes of 
descent. The state courts awarded John Jones' land to his widow, and 
Will Jones took a writ of error to the Supreme Court. 
Justice Lurton, affirming the judgment of a state court on which he had 
once served, explained that the Tennessee Supreme Court's construction 
was but an application of the common law principle that certain catego? 
ries of persons, such as aliens and bastards, were excluded from general 
laws of descent because they lacked, in the vivid common law metaphor, 
"inheritable blood." In Tennessee and in other slave states, the "uninher- 
itable blood" doctrine was merely an aspect of white society's general de? 
nial of black slaves' property rights, a detailed network of laws that Lur? 
ton summed up with a quotation from Kent's Commentaries: "They 
cannot take property by descent or purchase, and all they find, and all 
they hold, belongs to the master."23 After emancipation, Lurton went on, 
former slave states passed statutes to give descendants of slaves rights of 
inheritance, but these statutes typically extended rights only to the chil- 
20. 234 U.S. 615 (1914). 
21. Shannon's Code Tknn. ? 4165 (Thompson 1918). 
22. Id. 
23. Kknt's Commentaries 278 (11th edition 1867), quoted in Jones v. Jones, 234 U.S. at 617. 
The eleventh edition, published two years after Appomattox and four years after emancipation, took 
no apparent notice of the anachronistic nature of its discussion of the law of slavery. The next edition, 
the first edited by Holmes, came out in 1873 and added this note, overly optimistic as it turned out, to 
the discussion of the law relating to slavery: "The abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment 
has put an end to the discussion formerly so numerous." 2 Kent's Commentaries 357 (12th ed. 
1873). Evidently not. 
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dren of slaves and not to their collateral relations. In Tennessee, for ex? 
ample, the collateral relations of former slaves were held even after the 
Civil War to possess no "inheritable blood." None of this, according to 
Lurton, concerned federal law. "Inheritance is governed by the lex rei 
sitae. It is not a natural or absolute right, but the creation of statute 
law."24 If one's right to inheritance is denied "because he must trace his 
pedigree or title to or through an alien, a bastard or a slave, the question 
is one to be determined by the local law."26 It did not matter to Lurton 
that John Jones had acquired his 87 acres when he was a freedman. Will 
Jones' claim that this was discrimination against those born as slaves and 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
his rights in the land were denied solely on account of the past slave status 
of his quitclaim grantors provoked a simple, shallow answer: "We are 
unable to see in the Tennessee statute of Descent any such denial of the 
equal protection of the law as is prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."26 
In defense of the Court's casual rejection of the constitutional claim, it 
must be said that no obvious injustice was done by the widow's victory 
over Will Jones. Perhaps this accounts for the surprising absence of any 
dissent, especially from Hughes and Day, but nothing in Lurton's discus? 
sion suggests that he was merely aiming at a just result. Both his un- 
troubled elision of the equal protection issue and the antebellum tone of 
his discussions of the absence of rights of slaves and of Tennessee's par? 
tial?and generous, as he seemed to think?recognition of inheritance 
rights for freedmen, suggests that he was comfortable with the principle 
that former slave status could be the basis for the denial of rights of 
intestacy. 
Although Lurton gave no justification for the exclusion of slaves and 
their offspring from collateral lines of descent, he did cite a North Caro? 
lina case, Tucker v. Bellamy, which justified the exclusion because: 
after they were emancipated?became freedmen?it was practically 
impossible to trace their relationships by blood while they were 
slaves, with any tolerable degree of certainty. The confused condition 
of their family ties and relationships . . . rendered it necessary to 
prescribe by statute who should be the heir at law, and from whom 
he might inherit.27 
24. 234 U.S. at 618. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 619. 
27. Tucker v. Bellamy, 98 N.C. 31, 32, 4 S.E. 34, 35 (1887). 
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Identifying the spouse and children of a deceased freedman was presuma? 
bly a simpler matter than identifying the siblings.28 
Had a similar reason underlain the Court's decision, Jones v. Jones 
could be viewed narrowly as a restriction on intestate succession by broth- 
ers and sisters of former slaves, and not as sanctioning any broader princi? 
ple that former slave status could be the basis for denying a wider range 
of inheritance rights. Even on the narrow view, however, the decision 
seems dubious under the Thirteenth Amendment, if not necessarily so 
under the relaxed equal protection doctrines of the day. For a state to 
deny any right, even a "non-vested" right such as intestate succession, on 
the basis of former slave status would appear to be a "badge of slavery" of 
precisely the sort that the Civil Rights Cases had said the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibited of its own force.29 That the right in question was 
not "a natural or absolute right, but the creation of statute law,"30 as 
Lurton emphasized, should not have mattered. The Civil Rights Act of 
1866 had ostensibly given all persons the same rights of inheritance as 
were enjoyed by whites. On the other hand, it must be allowed that the 
difficulty of proving collateral relations among persons born as slaves 
might have been thought to justify the Tennessee approach. The unanim- 
ity of the court suggests that this might have been the view of some of the 
Justices. Nevertheless, the Yale Law Journal, in the only notice taken of 
the decision in the law reviews, offered an approach more in keeping with 
the Thirteenth Amendment. It analyzed the question of collateral relation 
as one of fact: "if a negro can prove to the satisfaction of the court his line 
of descent . . . though it pass through slave ancestry, he should be entitled 
to the same consideration as a native born white person."31 
28. Lurton himself, while a judge on the Tennessee Supreme Court, had written an opinion in 
Brown v. Cheatham, 91 Tenn. 97 (1892), holding that slave marriages should be deemed legitimate in 
the eyes of the law. 
29. The appellant's brief, a revelation of attitudes thought persuasive in this time, had argued: 
[T]here is but one question actually involved in this lawsuit, and that is whether or not ex- 
slaves ... are entitled to inherit from their brothers and sisters, who were likewise ex-slaves, 
and whether or not the mark of bondage will still remain upon the poor, unfortunate colored 
race, who served so faithfully their master before the Emancipation Proclamation by Mr. Lin? 
coln, and who in fact to this day are as faithful to the white man as they were in the days of 
slavery. 
It went on, embracing the distinction laid down in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896): 
This is not a case where social equality is undertaken to be enforced, but is a case where civil 
rights of persons of color or ex-slaves are attempted to be enforced. Were it a question of social 
equality it would be an entirely different proposition .... 
Brief for Appellant at 7, 8, Jones v. Jones, 234 U.S. 615 (1914). 
The brief for appellee, on the other hand, made two points, both of which appear in Justice Lur- 
ton's opinion. "The only right claimed is the right to inherit and that is not a natural right." And, 
"nothing is better settled than the proposition that questions of descent are to be determined by local 
law." Brief for Appellee at 8, 13. 
30. 234 U.S. at 618. 
31. Comment, The Right of Inheritance of Freedmen Born of Slave Parents, 24 Yale L.J. 75, 
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Horace Harmon Lurton handed down Jones v. Jones on June 22, 
1914, his last day of active service on the Supreme Court. He had recently 
returned from a four-month absence caused by illness, and death was but 
three weeks away. The opinion seems perhaps a fitting last word, both a 
remembrance of things past for the former fiery secessionist, and a state? 
ment of antebellum claims on the present and the future, as he blandly 
accepted a legal discrimination resting on former slave status in the law of 
his native state. 
Lurton's record on the Supreme Court in cases involving the rights of 
blacks reveals a man untroubled by the state of race relations in the years 
before World War I.32 In Bailey v. Alabama,** the first Peonage Case, 
Lurton joined Holmes's dissent, fulfilling the pessimistic prophesies of 
those Progressive opponents of his appointment like Edward A. Moseley, 
Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission, who had written Taft 
that Lurton never spoke a word "in recognition of the right of those who 
toil."3* There is convincing evidence that Lurton was set to dissent in the 
Grandfather Clause Cases,35 which did not come down until after his 
death, although whether he would merely have joined Lamar's dissent in 
United States v. Mosley** on statutory construction, or whether he would 
have gone further into wholesale dissent on the constitutionality of the 
Grandfather Clause is not clear.37 Lurton was with the four who re- 
mained aloof from Hughes' insistence on equality in McCabe v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,ss the Oklahoma luxury railroad car case, and, as 
we shall see, he joined Holmes's dissent in the Creswill case,39 which up? 
held the right of a black fraternal organization called the Knights of Pyth- 
ias to use the same name as a white organization. To Theodore Roosevelt, 
Lurton might have been "right on the Negro question,"40 but in race rela- 
77 (1914). 
32. Lurton could support black aspirations when channeled along approved lines. On March 14, 
1910, Lurton had written a letter to President Taft, exemplifying their close relationship even on 
matters far from judicial business, recommending the appointment of J.C. Napier of Nashville as 
Registrar of the United States Treasury, an appointment, as Lurton understood, that "is always set 
apart for some member bf the colored race. . . . Aside from Booker Washington, I believe he is the 
best representative of the colored race south of the Ohio River. He is in thorough accord with Booker 
Washington and accompanies him on many of his speaking and educational tours." Letter from Hor- 
ace Lurton to President William H. Taft (Mar. 14, 1910), Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 1A. 
Library of Congress, quoted in A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 341. 
33. 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (peonage law, making failure to perform labor contract a criminal of? 
fense, violates Thirteenth Amendment). 
34. Letter from Edward Moseley to President William H. Taft (Nov. 22, 1909), quoted in A. 
Bickel & B. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 75. 
35. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). 
36. 238 U.S. 383, 388 (1915) (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
37. See A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 945-49. 
38. 235 U.S. 151 (1914); see A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 775-84. 
39. Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246 (1912). 
40. A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 75. There is reason to think that Theodore 
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tions cases decided by the Supreme Court during his brief four-year ten? 
ure, Lurton was utterly content with looking backward. For, as Willis 
Van Devanter recalled in a vivid address years later, Lurton was "a Con- 
federate through and through,"41 and as Hughes summed him up, a "typ? 
ical judge of the old school."42 
II. Creswill v. Knights of Pythias: Separate, But Equal in 
Name 
Creswill v. Knights oj Pythias43 was a long, complicated decision 
handed down in 1912 that resorted to general principles of equity seem- 
ingly lacking any federal dimension in order to correct what Chief Justice 
White and a majority evidently saw as a palpable racial injustice. The 
case has puzzled several generations of students of federal jurisdiction.44 
For some years, two fraternal and benevolent orders known as the 
Knights of Pythias had existed side by side, one for white males, one for 
black males, separate, to be sure, but equal as to name. This nominal 
parity became an affront to the white Knights in Georgia. The white 
Knights had been chartered in the District of Columbia by Congress, first 
in 1864 and subsequently by later federal incorporation statutes, and 
grand and subordinate lodges had been established in a number of states, 
including Georgia in 1871. The black Knights of Pythias was originally 
established in Mississippi in 1880, and under the name "The Supreme 
Lodge Knights of Pythias, North and South America, Europe, Asia, and 
Africa" became a District of Columbia corporation by virtue of Congres? 
sional charter in 1889. The black Knights also established a Grand Lodge 
in Georgia, informally in 1886, and by formal designation of the Supreme 
Roosevelt did not know a great deal about Lurton when he wrote this or, at least, that what he did 
know came by way of Lurton's perennial sponsor, close friend, and former colleague on the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, William Howard Taft. In an effort to calm Lodge's agitation against Lur? 
ton, Roosevelt had written that Lurton was "right on the Negro question; he is right on the power of 
the Federal Government; he is right about corporations; and he is right about labor." Id. But when 
E.A. Moseley, Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission, at the request of Attorney General 
Moody, investigated Lurton's positions in cases involving the federal commerce power, he reported: 
"With one exception, Judge Lurton has decided against the contention of the Government in every 
case under the Interstate Commerce law which has come before him." This, of course, killed Lurton's 
chances with Roosevelt. Heffron, Profile of a Public Man, in Yearbook 1980, Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc. 
30, 34. There is no reason to suppose that Roosevelt knew any more about Lurton's attitudes toward 
race relations than he did about his positions on the commerce power. 
41. W. Van Devanter, Address to The Colorado Bar Association, Fortieth Annual Meeting 60-68 
(H. Humphreys ed., Sept. 10-11, 1937). 
42. C. Hughes, Biographical Notes, Microfilm, Ac. 9943, p. 220, Library of Congress. 
43. 225 U.S. 246 (1912). 
44. See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 524 (2d ed. 1972); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943 
970 n.106 (1965). 
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Lodge in 1890. According to the Georgia courts, there were some 300,000 
black Knights nationwide, with about 30,000 members in Georgia. 
In 1905, when the black Knights' Grand Lodge in Georgia applied to 
the state courts to be chartered as a domestic Georgia corporation, the 
white Knights petitioned the state court not only to prevent the incorpora? 
tion but also to enjoin the black Knights from using the name insignia, 
emblems, etc. of the Knights of Pythias. The white Knights argued that 
such use infringed their interest in the name and was a fraud on the pub? 
lic. The black Knights presented a number of defenses to this petition. 
The black Knights contended that they had a right to the name under the 
Congressional charter, and that since the public well knew that there were 
two, racially distinct Knights of Pythias, there was no danger of fraud. 
Moreover, the black Knights insisted that because the two orders had ex- 
isted side by side in harmony for many years the white Knights were 
barred from relief by the equitable doctrine of laches, a doctrine requiring 
timely objection to alleged equitable infringements rooted in policies of 
estoppel and the notion that there can be little injury if the victim has let 
matters slide. The white Knights eventually prevailed in the Georgia 
courts, and a decree issued in 1908 denying the black Knights the right to 
incorporate in Georgia and barring them from using the name Knights of 
Pythias.48 
When the case came before the Supreme Court on writ of error, Chief 
Justice White, for the majority, was obviously determined to reverse this 
decision, but he faced considerable difficulties in figuring out how to do 
so.46 White was clear that the right of the black Knights to use the name 
was a right or privilege claimed under federal law, and that in denying 
this right the Georgia courts had relied not on any state statute but on 
"principles of general law" applicable to trademarks and tradenames. 
Therefore, the state courts' application of these general principles was 
subject to Supreme Court review. White accepted, for purposes of the ap? 
peal, though carefully indicating doubts, that the Georgia courts were 
right in deciding that benevolent orders had a legal interest in exclusive 
use of their name, and that the white Knights, having had the name first 
in time thereby had a right to prevent injury caused by another's use of 
the same name. But the question of laches was also a matter of general 
law, White insisted. Now it was true, White said, that state court findings 
of fact were not as such subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of 
error, but where a federal right and findings of fact were so intermingled 
that protecting the right required analyzing the facts, the Supreme Court 
45. Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 133 Ga. 837, 67 S.E. 188 (1910). 
46. In the Supreme Court, the black Knights were represented by Alton B. Parker, among others. 
Creswill, 225 U.S. at 247. 
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must review the facts as well as the law. White then made a swift thrust 
and retreat. He insisted that the evidence did not support at all the con? 
clusions of the state court that the black Knights intended to defraud the 
public, or that their use of the name in any way injured the white 
Knights. "But strong as are our convictions as to these subjects, we prefer 
not to rest our conclusion upon them, but rather to place the decree of 
reversal which we shall render, upon the application to the facts of the 
well-settled doctrine on the subject of laches."47 White thought the white 
Knights' failure to object to the black order's use of the name over many 
years, and the open and active existence of the black order in Georgia 
"leave no room for any other but the legal conclusion of laches."48 Thus 
elementary principles of equity were violated by the injunction preventing 
the black Knights from using the name.49 
Holmes, joined by Lurton, dissented in a particularly Delphic, almost 
impenetrable, paragraph.80 When a federal right was held by a state court 
to have been lost by subsequent conduct not in itself involving any federal 
question, such as laches, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reverse 
unless the state court was in substance denying the right: 
I do not see the distinction by which we can review the decision in 
the opposite case, where it is held that the right is not lost or that it 
cannot be interfered with because of laches on the other side. ... I 
will content myself with saying that I do not see how the decision 
can be reversed on the ground of laches.81 
(One can almost see Holmes bending over backward to affirm that he sits 
on a court of law and not on a court of justice.) 
Holmes would probably be considered to have the better of the argu? 
ment under modern theories of Supreme Court review, after Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins62 disavowed the notion of federal review of state court 
applications of general principles of the common law. After Erie, whether 
a state court should invoke laches to bar equitable relief would be consid? 
ered a state law question, reviewable by the Supreme Court only if the 
doctrine were invoked in a manipulative way for the purpose of denying a 
federal right. Where a state court did not invoke the doctrine, and granted 
47. Id. at 262. 
48. Id. 
49. Although the laches issue was determinative, White could not quite resist pointing out that the 
Georgia courts had reached incompatible conclusions in finding that the black Knights had deceived 
the public and hurt the white order over many years, but that the white order had not known about 
the asserted injury until the black Knights sought state incorporation. Id. at 259, 262. 
50. Id. at 263 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. 
52. 304 U.S. 64 (1937). 
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equitable relief, the end result might as a matter of substance violate a 
federal right, but not because laches was not invoked, rather because as a 
matter of substance the state court's relief invaded a federal right. A 
plaintiffs federal right could be invaded by invocation of the doctrine of 
laches, but it is hard to see how a defendant's federal right could be in? 
vaded by noninvocation of laches against the plaintiff. Thus today, the 
Georgia courts' refusal to invoke laches in the Creswill situation would be 
considered a state law question beyond federal review. As Professor Alfred 
Hill has written: "It seems rather extraordinary that the Court should 
have deemed it proper in these circumstances to pass on the state 
ground."58 The black Knights still might win, but only on the ground that 
they had a federal right to use their name, not because the state court 
refused to honor their defense that the plaintiff had not made timely ob? 
jection. In his Creswill dissent, Holmes revealed his positivist skepticism 
about the very idea of general principles of common law. Law was not a 
"brooding omnipresence," but rather the expression of sovereign power, 
and it followed for Holmes that unless a federal right was invaded, the 
state courts could make what they wanted of equity principles. 
As matters stood in 1912, however, White and the majority were in 
keeping with accepted notions of federal review in taking on the whole 
case where a federal right was adjudicated under generally applicable 
common law principles. The opinion in Creswill is the work of an appel? 
late judge bent on the correction of injustice, and White took pains to 
indicate that there were several possible grounds for reversing the Georgia 
courts before he fell back on the laches doctrine. Creswill thus reveals the 
majority's sense of justice. A summary affirmance could easily have rested 
on deference to the state court's findings, but the Supreme Court saw an 
injustice to the black Knights of Pythias and Edward Douglass White 
found a way to correct it.54 
III. Roads Not Taken 
Of the four main areas of law that cemented the wretched and deterio- 
rating place of black people in American society during the Progressive 
era, the one most centrally involving courts of law was, oddly enough, the 
one the White Court let alone. Peonage, disfranchisement, and racial sep? 
aration saw major decisions that began to uphold some of the promises of 
the Civil War Amendments. But the routine victimization of black people 
53. Hill, supra note 44, at 970 n.106. 
54. For other decisions of the White Court extending protective federal jurisdiction to the Knights 
of Pythias based on its federal incorporation, but without racial implications, see Knights of Pythias v. 
Mims, 241 U.S. 574 (1916); Knights of Pythias v. Smyth, 245 U.S. 594 (1918); see also Ancient 
Egyptian Arabic Order of Nobles of the Mystic Shrine v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929). 
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in the administration of the criminal law was not touched by the White 
Court, partly because the evidence of discrimination, blatant as it seems in 
retrospect, lay beneath the face of statutes, and partly because notions of 
procedural justice were fixed on the rudimentary essentials of notice and a 
hearing, the minimal requisites of due process of law spelled out in Jus? 
tice Moody's magisterial 1908 opinion in Twining v. New Jersey*5 
Ironically, the most vigorous early statement of the anti-discrimination 
principle had come in a criminal procedure case. The state statute struck 
down in 1880 in Strauder v. West Virginia** had excluded blacks from 
grand and petit juries. Between Strauder and the passing of Chief Justice 
White in 1921, all but one of the sixteen decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court concerning racial discrimination in the criminal process 
involved the exclusion of blacks from juries. Pace v. Alabama*1 in 1882 
was the exception, an unsuccessful challenge to a statute that provided 
greater punishment for interracial adultery or fornication than it did for 
intraracial adultery or fornication. 
Though peonage cases involved the criminal process and had important 
racial consequences, no explicit racial discrimination was at issue in them, 
and the Supreme Court downplayed the racial impact. None of the cases 
of the period dealt with the pervasive racial segregation in the courthouse, 
which extended from routine segregation of spectators on different sides of 
the courtroom to Jim Crow Bibles and witness stands, because this segre? 
gation rested on custom and official discretion rather than statutes.88 Nor 
did the Supreme Court deal with derogatory racial epithets and modes of 
address that were common in southern courtrooms around the turn of the 
century.89 Perhaps most warping to the possibility of equal justice, virtu? 
ally every embodiment of the legal process in the South, from the police to 
the prosecutors to the courtroom functionaries up to the judges, was lily- 
white. "No Negro holds a job in the courthouse higher than polishing 
55. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
56. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
57. 106 U.S. 583 (1882). 
58. See R. Baker, Following the Color Line 45, 96, 141 (1967). 
59. In a major peonage prosecution that ended in acquittal in which the defendants were repre? 
sented by the Attorney General-elect of Georgia, federal district judge Emory Speer made news when 
he admonished counsel: 
[D]on't you think the future Attorney General of the state of Georgia can spare us this 'nigger, 
nigger, nigger'? It sounds so unworthy of a great court of justice, and so unworthy of your own 
position at the bar to be alluding to these poor unfortunate creatures constantly in the lowest 
terms of degradations. 
A Recent Georgia Peonage Case: Throwing a Sidelight on Legal and Social Conditions in the South, 
23 The Green Bag 525, 528 (1911). Neither the future Attorney General of Georgia nor most of 
the trial courts of the South shared Speer's punctilio. See, e.g., Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 
161, 164 (1910) (repeated use of "nigger" to refer to defendant). 
1693 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.25 on Thu, 6 Jun 2013 21:00:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1681, 1986 
spittoons," wrote William Archer in his 1910 Comparison of the Southern 
United States and South Africa.60 
Juries, grand and petit, were the one agency of southern justice that 
blacks might realistically have had a chance to enter, and on which their 
presence might have ameliorated the harsh racial bias of law enforcement 
in the South. But after Strauder had invalidated a state law that in terms 
barred blacks from serving on juries, the focus of the jury discrimination 
cases shifted to laws and administration that still barred blacks from ju? 
ries, but did so without saying that they did in so many words.61 Between 
1880 and 1935, the Supreme Court utterly failed to come to grips with 
these new ways of rigidly, systematically excluding blacks from southern 
juries. I have written about this line of decisions and tried to analyze the 
complicated impotence of the federal courts in responding to jury discrimi? 
nation claims, and I do not want to go over that ground again in these 
pages.62 What is most significant about the decisions in jury discrimina? 
tion cases is what they did not do, but a few nonetheless call for mention 
as being of particular historical interest for other reasons. 
One decision of this kind, touching on peonage as well as the question 
of the power to resist an unlawful arrest, was Franklin v. South Caro? 
lina,** decided in May 1910 in the last days of the Fuller Court. Frank? 
lin was the first case in which the fledgling NAACP launched a major 
intervention, and the case eventually came to touch such notables as Presi? 
dent Taft, former Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, and Booker T. 
Washington, among others. 
Pink Franklin, a black farmhand in South Carolina, had left the land 
and employ of a white planter in breach of contract and without repaying 
an advance. A sheriff and a deputy went to Franklin's home in the dead 
of night to arrest him for violating South Carolina's contract fraud law, a 
parallel provision to the Alabama peonage law struck down early in 1911 
in Bailey v. Alabama*4, This law had already been declared invalid by 
60. W. Archer, Through Afro-America, An English Reading of the Race Problem 89 
(1910). 
61. In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881), one year after Strauder, the Supreme Court 
quashed the indictment of a black man who alleged that no blacks served on grand or petit juries. 
Delaware statutes did not sanction discrimination, but the state court conceded the exclusion of blacks 
in denying the defendant's notions: "that none but white men were selected is in nowise remarkable in 
view of the fact?too notorious to be ignored?that the great body of black men residing in this State 
are utterly unqualified by want of intelligence, experience, or moral integrity to sit on juries." Id. at 
395. The Supreme Court, in reversing, called this "a violent presumption," and held that the uniform 
exclusion of blacks made out a prima facie case of the denial of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 
397. See also Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882) (setting aside murder indictment because Ken- 
tucky law excluded Blacks from grand jury). 
62. Schmidt, supra note 19, at 1410. 
63. 218 U.S. 161 (1910). 
64. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
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both the federal district court in South Carolina and by the state supreme 
court,66 but this did not diminish the sheriffs zeal. A gunfight erupted 
under confused circumstances. Franklin, his wife, and his infant son were 
wounded, the sheriff was killed, and the deputy wounded. Franklin and 
his wife were arrested and very nearly lynched by a mob at the county 
jail. Franklin was eventually convicted of murder and sentenced to be 
hanged. As with most convictions of blacks that were reviewed in the Su? 
preme Court in this period, a challenge to the make-up of the grand and 
petit juries, lily-white of course, was routinely made, but the jury question 
took a back seat to other claims thought to be weightier. 
The issue that attracted most attention was whether a black sharecrop- 
per in the deep South sought to be arrested at gunpoint in dark of night 
under confused and threatening circumstances, under an invalid, and in? 
deed invalidated, peonage statute, could resist with deadly force.66 If 
Franklin's version of the arrest was to be believed, he was sleeping 
soundly when a stranger flung open his bedroom door, yelled "hands up" 
and then shot him without provocation, leading Franklin to scramble for 
his gun to defend himself. The state's evidence was that the sheriff had 
knocked on the door, called out to Franklin, and only entered after there 
was no response, whereupon Franklin shot him without warning. 
Whatever the facts, the plight of the black sharecropper awakened at gun? 
point by an unknown man for violating an unconstitutional peonage law 
attracted national attention. In the Supreme Court, Charles J. Bonaparte, 
Attorney General in Theodore Roosevelt's second term, was retained by 
the Constitution League to submit a brief on Franklin's behalf.67 
In a somewhat troubled opinion by Justice Day for a unanimous 
Court, all of Franklin's contentions were dismissed. The validity of draw- 
ing jurors from the lists of qualified voters was routinely affirmed in view 
of the absence of open discrimination on the face of South Carolina's suf- 
frage statutes. Typical of many jury discrimination cases of this period,68 
Day woodenly recited that it was essential for Franklin to show that the 
suffrage scheme actually operated to exclude blacks from juries, and he 
65. Ex parte Drayton, 153 F. 986 (1907); Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9 (1907). 
66. There were other issues: whether the state had unlawfully refused Franklin's evidence ad- 
duced at an inquest, whether the sheriff s dying declaration was admissible, and whether a continu- 
ance should have been granted. 
67. The Constitution League was founded by a wealthy industrialist, John Milholland, to pro? 
mote racial justice by court action, legislation, and publicity. A. Meier, Negro Thought in 
America: 1880-1915, at 181 (1969). 
Bonaparte submitted a brief, but was unable to persuade Franklin's black South Carolina lawyers, 
whose handling of the case in the state courts was patently inadequate, to let him become chief coun? 
sel in the Supreme Court. C. Kellogg, NAACP: A History of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People 58 (1967); see also R. Kluger, Simple Justice 101 
(1976). 
68. See Schmidt, supra note 19, at 1455-58. 
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had failed to make this showing. It did not matter that jury commissioners 
operated under a vague mandate to select from the voter role "men of 
good moral character."69 Proof of actual exclusion was essential.70 Oddly, 
Day gave virtually no doctrinal consideration to the main issue pressed by 
Bonaparte?whether blacks could legally be "forbidden, on pain of death, 
to defend themselves against similar violent attempts to reduce them to 
virtual slavery"?although he referred to the grave questions raised by 
"eminent counsel" and he presented the contested claims about Franklin's 
arrest in evocative detail. However, despite the unanimity of the Court's 
rejection of Franklin's claims, the style of Day's opinion suggests that he, 
and perhaps others on the court, caught the odor of victimization that 
surrounded the case. It is a measure of the solid acquiescence of the Court 
in lily-white southern justice that a jury discrimination claim in such a 
case as Franklin did not stir any of the Justices to question the impotence 
of the Supreme Court's appellate process in placing on impecunious black 
defendants, usually "represented" by utterly passive white counsel, the 
burden of proving racial exclusion across a whole hidden and discretion? 
ary system of jury selection. 
The great historical importance of the Franklin case did not rest on the 
Supreme Court's handling of it. After Franklin's appeal failed, the case 
became the first one taken up by the then new NAACP, although only in 
pardon proceedings. The NAACP made a major, and eventually success? 
ful, effort to have the Govemor of South Carolina commute Franklin's 
death sentence to life imprisonment, enlisting in the effort, among others, 
President Taft and Booker T. Washington. The NAACP did not stop 
there. Nine years later, after extensive NAACP efforts, Franklin was fi- 
nally set free.71 
During the time that White was Chief Justice, the Supreme Court de? 
clined at least two other chances to deal with the problem of jury discrimi? 
nation, in both cases on justifiable but not quite compelling grounds of 
avoidance. Kitchens v. Hamilton72 was, like the Franklin case, the judi? 
cial residue of a violent interaction between black and white that conveyed 
an aura of lawlessness and victimization. 
Robert Kitchens, his brother, and his cousin, were charged by an all- 
white Georgia grand jury with murdering one Henry Brantley, a white 
man, immediately after Brantley had allegedly beaten and sexually mo- 
lested Kitchens' 12-year-old sister. Three other family members were in? 
dicted as accessories. An all-white petit jury convicted Kitchens and he 
69. Franklin, 218 U.S. at 168. 
70. Id. 
71. See C. Kellogg, supra note 67, at 59. 
72. 239 U.S. 637 (1916). 
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was sentenced to be hanged. Kitchens did not raise the jury discrimination 
issue at trial, and the Georgia courts therefore refused to consider the 
claim, despite Kitchens' contention that it was fear of mob violence at the 
trial that had prevented his white lawyer from raising the jury exclusion 
claim. Kitchens sought habeas in the Georgia federal district court before 
Judge Emory Speer, but was denied relief, without hearing or opinion. In 
the Supreme Court, Kitchens bolstered this discrimination claim with the 
argument that the Georgia law pertaining to jury selection was so vague 
as to invite the exclusion of blacks. Under the Georgia Constitution, jurors 
were to be limited to "the most experienced, intelligent and upright 
men."73 On January 17, 1916, the Court affirmed without opinion on the 
authority of Andrews v. Swartz74 and Frank v. Mangum.? 
The other case disposed of without opinion that might have tested the 
legality of jury discrimination was Moore v. Arkansas,7* handed down in 
1920, the initial appeal of the celebrated case that led three years later to 
the landmark habeas decision, Moore v. Dempsey.77 The case grew out of 
the bloody race riot in eastern Arkansas in September 1919, one of the 
pattern of race riots that rocked the United States in the bloody summer 
of 1919.78 A group of black tenant farmers that had organized a union to 
deal with their grievances against the white landowners were meeting in a 
church in Hoop Spur in Phillips County, and, depending on whose ver? 
sion of the events is believed, were either fired upon by two white deputies 
or attacked the deputies without provocation. One deputy was killed, the 
other wounded. As rumors swept the county that blacks had organized to 
massacre whites, the sheriff swore in 300 deputies and the governor called 
in 500 soldiers from the U.S. Army. Armed white bands went on a mur- 
derous rampage. A handful of whites and somewhere between 25 and 200 
blacks were killed in the resulting violence.79 Several hundred blacks were 
taken into custody and there is much evidence of widespread torture in the 
interrogations and confinements that followed.80 Federal and state author? 
ities treated the events as virtually a full-scale black insurrection. 
Moore was among the first group tried of the more than one hundred 
blacks indicted for various offenses. As armed mobs surrounded the court? 
house in Elaine, Arkansas, a travesty of justice produced death sentences 
73. Ga. Const. art. iv, ? 16. 
74. 156 U.S. 272 (1895). 
75. 237 US. 309 (1915). 
76. 254 U.S. 630 (1920). 
77. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
78. See A. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960's 121 (1966). 
79. R. Kluger, supra note 67, at 112-115. 
80. The only white arrested was a lawyer who had agreed to help the black sharecroppers' associ? ation press their claims. Id. 
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in less than an hour as Moore and five others were sentenced to die for 
murdering the deputy who had been shot at Hoop Spur. Among Moore's 
many points on appeal were that blacks had been excluded from the 
grand and petit juries that indicted and convicted him, that counsel ap- 
pointed to represent him had been ineffective, that a mob had dominated 
his trial and intimidated all the participants, and that the state's witnesses 
had been tortured into giving their incriminating testimony. The white 
lawyer assigned to represent Moore and the others had no access to the 
black defendants before the trial and put on no witnesses in their behalf. 
Moreover, Moore's counsel did not raise the jury discrimination claim at 
trial, because he was, succeeding counsel claimed, intimidated and 
incompetent. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to consider Moore's jury dis? 
crimination complaint, since it had not been raised at the trial.81 A writ of 
certiorari was sought in the Supreme Court in October 1920, but was 
denied. The inflamed injustice of the criminal process in Phillips County, 
Arkansas, would not be noticed in the Supreme Court until Moore v. 
Dempsey was decided in 1923. 
Conclusion 
The cases discussed so far in this postscript all arose in the South. I 
conclude with mention of a case that shows both the painful and absurd 
lengths to which the drive for racial separation was pressed, and that the 
North was prone to the pressure of Jim Crow, as well. For me, it is the 
most poignant of the race cases of this period, although as with others 
discussed it was hardly touched by the Supreme Court. 
On March 8, 1915, the Supreme Court dismissed for want of jurisdic? 
tion Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery*2 a case that foreshadowed a prob? 
lem that would split the Supreme Court forty years later in Rice v. Sioux 
City Memorial Park Cemetery*3 Gaskill challenged an exclusion on ac? 
count of race of a body from a cemetery just outside of Chicago, Illinois. 
Mr. and Mrs. John B. Gaskill had buried four of their children in the 
Forest Home Cemetery between 1890 and 1906, but by the time Mrs. 
Gaskill died in 1912, the cemetery had adopted a policy of interring white 
people only because, "Many of our patrons of the white race object to the 
burial of the remains of the colored race in their proximity." The man? 
agement sent regrets that the mother would not be permitted to 
lie in 
repose with her children: "We have no personal prejudice or ill feeling 
81. Hicks v. State, 143 Ark. 158, 220 S.W. 308 (1920). 
82. 238 U.S. 606 (1915). 
83. 348 U.S. 880 (1954); cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). 
1698 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.25 on Thu, 6 Jun 2013 21:00:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Supreme Court and Race 
toward the colored people . . . but we must do what is best for our busi? 
ness regardless of personal feeling."84 Gaskill sued in the Illinois courts, 
asserting that the exclusion violated the Fourteenth Amendment. He did 
not clear the state action hurdle. The cemetery was not required by its 
corporate charter to serve all customers, it did not have the power of emi- 
nent domain, it was not a monopoly, and therefore it was not impressed 
with constitutional obligations applicable to the state, reasoned the Su? 
preme Court of Illinois.86 The United States Supreme Court heard argu? 
ment in the case but saw no need for an opinion. Its summary disposition 
cited six cases in support of its dismissal, none of which involved racial 
discrimination and all of which were cases in which state law was held to 
govern the outcome of various commercial transactions. The Court's dis? 
missal provoked no notice in either the daily press in Chicago or Wash? 
ington, or in legal periodicals. But perhaps it is not too late in an issue 
honoring the work of Charles Black to remember Mrs. Gaskill and her 
separation after life from her children. 
84. These statements were included in Gaskill's petition to the Illinois Courts and were part of 
the record before the Supreme Court. 
85. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 111. 36, 101 N.E. 219 (1913). 
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